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INTRODUCTION
It is a false narrative that school segregation only exists in southern
states.1 In fact, New York City (“NYC”) is one of the most segregated
school districts in America.2 NYC public schools have failed—and still
fail—to provide Black and Latinx3 students with the same resources and
opportunities as white students.4 These racial disparities have persisted in
NYC for as long as the South has dealt with federally mandated desegregation.5 In the late 1950s, while the federal government tried to enforce
the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education6 decision in Southern
schools, white families in NYC actively fought against a citywide integration plan.7

1

E.g., Rebecca Klein, The South Isn’t the Reason Schools Are Still Segregated, New
York Is, HUFFPOST (Apr. 1, 2016, 5:05 AM), https://perma.cc/MK8X-AF5U.
2
JOHN KUCSERA & GARY ORFIELD, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, NEW YORK STATE’S
EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED FUTURE, at vi
(2014), https://perma.cc/6U37-BEVB.
3
This Note uses the term “Latinx” to encompass folks who have been described as Latino and/or Hispanic as a way to recognize both a gender-neutral and an anti-Spanish colonialist depiction of people who are from Latin America and/or speak Spanish, unless a source
specifically uses a different term. For more information, see Yara Simón, Hispanic vs. Latino
vs. Latinx: A Brief History of How These Words Originated, REMEZCLA: CULTURE (Sept.
14, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://perma.cc/AA4G-GYMU and Terry Blas, I’m Latino. I’m Hispanic. And They’re Different, So I Drew a Comic to Explain., VOX, https://perma.cc/J8GCQWR6 (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 8:42 AM).
4
KUCSERA, supra note 2, at 24, 29.
5
See MICHAEL F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL
RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 29-30 (2016); Klein, supra note 1.
6
Brown v. Board of Education was a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court
ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
However, schools did not integrate immediately after this decision. Instead, it took legislative
interventions from Congress to galvanize the process. See Ian Millhiser, ‘Brown v. Board of
Education’ Didn’t End Segregation, Big Government Did, NATION (May 14, 2014),
https://perma.cc/V3G2-3BMU (explaining that Southern lawyers used the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to challenge schools that refused to integrate).
7
See, e.g., DELMONT, supra note 5, at 32-34; Nikole Hannah-Jones, Choosing a School
for My Daughter in a Segregated City, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6A4D-T362; Yasmeen Khan, Demand for School Integration Leads to Massive 1964 Boycott — in New York City, WNYC (Feb. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/W7CJ-DV4W;
Christina Veiga, New York City Students Share Why They’re Fighting for School Integration,
CHALKBEAT (Dec. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/3SFX-ZRP6. See generally Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REC. 4459 (1956). The NYC Board of Education formed the Commission
on Integration in 1955 to create an integration plan in compliance with the Supreme Court’s
order in Brown I. Khan, supra. The integration plan sought to rezone a small percentage of
schools to prevent overcrowding and to improve the quality of education for predominantly
Black and Latinx schools. Id.
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School segregation has worsened in the last twenty years.8 Schools
have resegregated in the South and have stayed segregated in the North.9
In fact, the number of segregated schools nationwide nearly doubled between 1996 and 2016.10 As of 2014, more than one-third of Black students
in the South attend an “intensely segregated” (ninety to one hundred percent minority) school.11 The most segregated school systems, however,
are in the North. In 2010, close to seventy-five percent of Black students
attended a school in NYC where less than ten percent of their peers were
white.12 Northern urban districts, which never officially enforced school
segregation, have maintained dual systems of education through decades
of redlining and strategic and exclusionary zoning.13 School districts in
NYC, Newark, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. are made up of a majority of minority and low-income students and are heavily segregated.14
Half of NYC’s schools are at least ninety percent Black or Latinx,15 while
Black and Latinx students comprise only about sixty-seven percent of the
City’s public school population.16
8

See Will Stancil, School Segregation Is Not a Myth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://perma.cc/AK6C-CD6S. See generally GARY ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
(2014), https://perma.cc/679R-L7KV (providing a statistical analysis to demonstrate that segregation has substantially increased in school districts and offering recommendations to adhere to the promise articulated in Brown).
9
See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT & CTR. FOR EDUC.
& CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS: MORE THAN A HALF-CENTURY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 7-8 (2017), https://perma.cc/T9XZ-A89G; Mimi Kirk, Southern Schools Are Resegregating, CITYLAB (May 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZA9A-CCT3.
10
Stancil, supra note 8 (defining a segregated school as a school where less than forty
percent of students are white); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, K-12
EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND
ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2016), https://perma.cc/CVT8-YAJW (“From school
years 2000-01 to 2013-14 . . . the percentage of all K-12 public schools that had high percentages of poor and Black or Hispanic students grew from nine to sixteen percent . . . .”).
11
ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
12
See JOHN KUCSERA, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, New York Metro, Summary in NEW
YORK STATE’S EXTREME SCHOOL SEGREGATION: INEQUALITY, INACTION AND A DAMAGED
FUTURE 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/8VXM-CUES.
13
Emily Lieb, How Segregated Schools Built Segregated Cities, CITYLAB (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://perma.cc/94PD-P9FC; Abel McDaniels, A New Path for School Integration, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 19, 2017 9:01 AM), https://perma.cc/8352-5EHE.
14
Alvin Chang, We Can Draw School Zones to Make Classrooms Less Segregated. This
Is How Well Your District Does., VOX, https://perma.cc/WD58-FHHE (last updated Aug. 27,
2018, 8:46 AM) (providing graphs that illustrate demographics of school attendance zones in
major cities).
15
Yasmeen Khan & Beth Fertig, School Integration 2.0: How Could New York City Do
It Better?, WNYC (June 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/U6GQ-EQJL.
16
NICOLE MADER & ANA CARLA SANT’ANNA COSTA, THE NEW SCH., CTR. FOR N.Y.C.
AFFAIRS, NO HEAVY LIFTING REQUIRED: NEW YORK CITY’S UNAMBITIOUS SCHOOL
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School segregation perpetuates white supremacy, a mechanism that
ensures white students are afforded better teachers, facilities, and opportunities than Black and Latinx students.17 Research clearly shows that integrated schools positively impact all students regardless of their race.18
Students who attend racially diverse schools have smaller test score gaps
and develop enhanced critical thinking, problem-solving skills, and creativity from working with peers who have different experiences from their
own.19 It is for these reasons that students, parents, and activists have
fought and are fighting to change school policies, in an effort to improve
the current academic reality for Black and Latinx students.
While this article focuses on litigation as a way to address educational inequality in NYC public schools, litigation is only one tool in a
broader effort to remedy the impact of segregation. In order to integrate
NYC public schools, the students and families most impacted by segregation must organize their communities, local politicians must enact responsive local legislation, and privileged parents must shift their views of
public education.20
Litigation has been used successfully to challenge segregation since
the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education.21 Those negatively impacted by school segregation, however, must be the ones who
push for a lawsuit to address the ramifications of segregated schools, in
order to ensure their needs are met and their desired outcomes are

‘DIVERSITY’ PLAN (2018), https://perma.cc/5R6R-HFRU; NYC Public Schools at a Glance,
N.Y. ST. EDUC. DEP’T, https://data.nysed.gov/profile.php?instid=7889678368 [https://perma.
cc/XE58-D2QR] (last visited May 9, 2019).
17
See Madina Toure, NYC Has the Most Segregated Schools in the Country. How Do We
Fix That?, OBSERVER (June 14, 2018, 5:03 PM), https://perma.cc/GZ2T-4TBE (highlighting
that NYC public schools have always been segregated due to white resistance and backlash);
Veiga, supra note 7.
18
See AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., THE CENTURY FOUND., HOW RACIALLY DIVERSE
SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CAN BENEFIT ALL STUDENTS 11-15 (2016), https://perma.
cc/3EUV-CPEQ (discussing the benefits of children attending diverse schools, including closing the “achievement gap,” positive learning outcomes, and an increased interracial understanding of other students).
19
Id. at 14.
20
See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 67-68 (1992); Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE. L.J. 470, 512
(1976). I developed this understanding, and the need for community organizing, in my experience as a former educator in NYC public schools.
21
See Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Districts Still Face Fights—and Confusion—on Integration, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/X9C3-RHBM (“The pace of the change
brought by the federal courts was breathtaking. In 1963, about [one] percent of [B]lack children in the South attended school with white children. By the early 1970s . . . [ninety] percent
of [B]lack children attended desegregated schools.”).
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reached.22 In NYC, it is Black and Latinx students who decide whether to
initiate a lawsuit to challenge their school system’s failure to provide them
with equal opportunities and resources to their white counterparts. It is
incumbent on attorneys who represent students in desegregation litigation
to make decisions that are driven by the desired outcomes of the community they serve. For example, the Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”)23 has been
successful in obtaining court orders that require districts to comply with
the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.24 However, in the aftermath
of Brown, a central critique of this strategy is that civil rights attorneys
have considered the desires of and the litigation’s impact on “constituents,” who may have had a disconnected interest in the outcome of the
lawsuit but had more access to civil rights lawyers to address school segregation, rather than the desires of and impact on “clients,” whom their
lawsuits purportedly served.25 In addition to meeting their burden of proof
in court, lawyers must stay rooted in understanding and advocating for
the needs of students and families in segregated communities.
The options for challenging school segregation in federal courts,
however, are limited, particularly in Northern school districts like NYC.
According to the standard set by the Supreme Court, NYC public schools
have never experienced de jure—intentional or “by law”—segregation.26
Instead, “school officials, politicians, and parents” who are against desegregation speak about segregation in NYC schools in such a way that it is
“innocent, natural, and lawful.”27 While school segregation is in part a
22

See Bell, supra note 20, at 471-72 (“[Civil rights lawyers] have not waivered in their
determination to implement Brown using racial balance developed in the hard-fought legal
battles of the last two decades . . . . Now that traditional racial balance remedies are becoming
increasingly difficult to achieve or maintain, there is tardy concern that racial balance may not
be the relief actually desired by the victims of segregated schools,” whose “educational interests may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their attorneys.”).
23
For more information about the LDF, see Our Mission, LDF, https://perma.cc/JKB9C6JT (last visited June 1, 2019).
24
See Desegregation Cases / Issues, LDF, https://perma.cc/QJM6-FL92 (last visited June
1, 2019).
25
Ronald Edmonds provides an example of this dynamic: low-income Black students
may be the particular clients in a class action desegregation lawsuit, but the constituents are
white and middle-class Blacks who drive the lawsuit forward with more access to civil rights
attorneys and often “categorically oppose[] majority Black schools.” Ronald R. Edmonds, Advocating Inequity: A Critique of the Civil Rights Attorney in Class Action Desegregation Suits,
3 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 176, 178-79 (1974); see also Bell, supra note 20, at 490-91 (discussing
the problem—articulated by Edmonds—that civil rights attorneys face when white supporters,
who contribute financially to a civil rights organization, do not share the same social outlook
as the client, who is typically from a majority-Black school district).
26
“We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called
de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 208 (1973).
27
DELMONT, supra note 5, at 32.
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result of housing segregation caused by state action, in the eyes of the
judicial system, school segregation in New York exists “by fact” and
without action by the state.28 In 1974, the Supreme Court made clear that,
in order to successfully challenge a school district for school segregation,
state action must be the cause of that segregation.29 For this reason, as an
alternative to challenging school segregation in federal courts, advocates
and plaintiffs have used school finance litigation in state courts across the
country, including in New York, to address the unequal funding schemes
that are permissible under state constitutions and that, in turn, negatively
impact schools with high concentrations of low-income students and high
percentages of minority students.30 Unfortunately, school finance litigation has not been a successful tool for plaintiffs in New York, as the New
York Court of Appeals has interpreted Article XI of the New York State
Constitution, the State’s Education Article, only to require public schools
to provide a low standard of education quality.31
Due to the New York Court of Appeals’ articulation that schools only
need to provide a minimum standard of education quality to its students
under the Education Article, challenges brought under the New York
State Constitution are unlikely to be successful. Thus, advocates must be
creative. This Note demonstrates how the NYC Human Rights Law
(“NYCHRL”), a powerful civil rights act, can be used to address racial
segregation in NYC public schools and to fight for equality, since the New
York Court of Appeals has blocked all other judicial avenues for relief.32
Combined with ongoing grassroots and legislative advocacy, the
NYCHRL can be utilized to effectively address school inequality and integrate NYC public schools. Litigation is a tool to be used in conjunction
28

The Supreme Court has issued rulings that essentially only allow challenges under the
Constitution for de jure, not de facto, segregation in federal court cases. See infra Section II.A.
“De jure” means according to law; “de facto” means existing in fact. De Jure, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); De Facto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Richard
Rothstein has described the idea that neighborhoods are de facto segregated as a “myth.” Richard Rothstein, The Reason America’s Schools Are So Segregated – and the Only Way To Fix
It, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/F4PK-LYFT. For a deeper analysis of the
close relationship between state action and residential segregation in America, see RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 215-17 (2017) (“Residential segregation was created by state
action . . . . If school boards had not placed schools and drawn attendance boundaries to ensure
the separation of black and white pupils, families might not have had to relocate to have access
to education for their children.”) (emphasis in original).
29
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (“[I]t must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district[,] have been
a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.”)
30
James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
529, 537 (1999).
31
See infra Sections III.B and IV.B.
32
See infra Sections III.B and IV.B.
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with organizing to address school segregation because, as stated by Louis
Menand of the New Yorker, “[d]e-facto discrimination—we now call it
‘institutional racism’ or ‘structural racism’—is much harder to address. It
requires more of people than just striking down a law.”33
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the foundation of desegregation litigation in federal courts. Part II briefly outlines the process for
desegregation litigation in federal court and explains why federal litigation is not a viable option for plaintiffs in NYC. Part III discusses school
finance litigation strategies in New York and other states. Part IV then
examines litigation in Minnesota that has sought to persuade courts to
read in an anti-segregation mandate into the state constitution and outlines
how the New York Court of Appeals has instead interpreted the Education
Article as holding schools to a weak standard. Part V focuses on the
NYCHRL and argues that it provides plaintiffs with a creative avenue to
seek relief for educational inequity by examining current litigation challenging unequal sports access for high school students in NYC. Finally,
Part VI discusses how grassroots movements are persistently organizing
to integrate the NYC public school system and provides suggestions for
future litigation under the NYCHRL.
I.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF DESEGREGATION LITIGATION

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court issued its decision on Brown
v. Board of Education (Brown I), which struck down the “separate but
equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson.34 Brown I consolidated
four cases, with students and parents from school districts in Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware as plaintiffs, represented by the
LDF.35 In this monumental decision, the Supreme Court abolished statesponsored segregation in public schools across United States by ruling
that school segregation deprived the plaintiffs of equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.36
If only it were that simple. In Brown I, the Supreme Court did not
order school districts to desegregate.37 Instead, one year after the Brown
I decision, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of school segregation
in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), which ordered school districts

33

Louis Menand, The Supreme Court Case that Enshrined White Supremacy in Law,
NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/YM9P-T9DA.
34
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
35
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1; Case: Landmark: Brown v. Board of Education, LDF,
https://perma.cc/8SYQ-HQVN (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
36
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
37
See id.
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to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.”38 This vague phrase allowed
segregationists to continue delaying integration for years.39 After Brown
II, plaintiffs spurred lawsuits in federal district courts across the country,
asking courts to issue orders forcing segregated school districts to integrate.40 As a result, courts issued orders mandating that states establish
concrete integration plans, which included “busing, facilities upgrades,
and compliance monitoring.”41 The impact on schools was drastic: in
1963, “[one] percent of black children in the South attended school with
white children. By the early 1970s . . . [ninety] percent of Black children
attended desegregated schools.”42
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s precedent after Brown I and
Brown II has not made the battle to integrate schools easier for students
and families. After forcing school districts with de jure segregation to integrate their public schools, the Supreme Court began to chip away at
families’ capacity to hold school districts and government actors accountable for allowing segregation in other schools to continue. In 1974, in
Milliken v. Bradley, the Court held that a federal district court may not
impose a multidistrict remedy for “a single-district de jure segregation
problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have
failed to operate unitary school systems within their districts.”43 Milliken
affected urban school districts’ ability to desegregate their schools

38

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). See Arthur E. Sutherland, Segregation by Race in Public Schools Retrospect and Prospect, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 169 n.1 (1955), for a discussion of states that had de jure segregation at the time Brown
II was decided.
39
This delay manifested itself in racist violence. For example, in 1957, Governor Orval
Faubus of Arkansas called on the state’s National Guard to forcibly prevent Black students
from integrating Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Only after President Dwight
D. Eisenhower deployed federal troops were the Black students able to enter the school as
angry protesters harassed them. Richard Kreitner, September 4, 1958: Arkansas Governor
Calls Out the National Guard to Prevent Public School Integration, NATION (Sept. 4, 2015),
https://perma.cc/E5QH-HPGU; David Smith, Little Rock Nine: The Day Young Students Shattered Racial Segregation, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/X6WDBS9V.
40
See generally Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since
Brown v. Board of Education, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10-49 (1975) (providing a discussion
of the implementation of the Brown I mandate by federal courts).
41
COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., DESEGREGATION
LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW 1, https://perma.cc/RG53-NU9K (last visited June 1, 2019).
42
Hannah-Jones, supra note 21.
43
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721 (1974). In Milliken, the Court highlighted that
the evidence only demonstrated a de jure segregation problem in the Detroit school district,
rather than a constitutional violation in any of the fifty-three outlying school districts or an
interdistrict violation thereof. Id. at 745. Further, urban school districts like Detroit could not
set aside arbitrary district lines on the basis of race. Id. at 745.
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through the use of busing measures44 involving white suburban districts.45
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was one of the counsel for plaintiffs in
Brown I, dissented in Milliken, stating that the Court had taken a “giant
step backward” in the fight to integrate public schools.46 Further contextualizing the negative impact of Milliken, Michael F. Delmont describes
the decision in Milliken as “plac[ing] a nearly impossible burden of proof
on those seeking school desegregation across city and suburban lines by
requiring evidence of deliberate segregation across multiple school districts.”47 Robert A. Sedler additionally observes that, after Milliken, “[t]he
substantive right that has emerged is not a right to attend a racially integrated school, but only a right to attend school in a school system in which
there are no vestiges of de jure segregation.”48
Then, in the 1990s, a series of cases curtailed a plaintiff’s power to
challenge de facto school segregation,49 by making “it easier for [school]
districts to be released from court oversight.”50 These cases increased the
rate at which school districts were released from court supervision, as
“more than twice as many districts were released [from judicial supervision] in the 2000s as in the 1990s.”51 By 2007, 193 of 480 Southern school

44

Busing was one tactic used to desegregate public schools by transporting primarily
Black students into white districts. Michael F. Delmont describes the white parents’ uproar
against “busing” in his book and corresponding website. DELMONT, supra note 5, at 3 (“Describing opposition to “busing” as something other than resistance to school desegregation
was a choice that obscured the histories of racial discrimination and legal contexts for desegregation orders.”).
45
See Robert A. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken v. Bradley, 33 WAYNE L. REV.
1693, 1695-96 (1987).
46
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47
DELMONT, supra note 5, at 17.
48
Sedler, supra note 45, at 1694,-95.
49
Hannah-Jones, supra note 21.
50
Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation
and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 87778 (2012). In Board of Education v. Dowell, the Supreme Court ruled that desegregation orders
were intended to be a “temporary measure” and that, in deciding whether to dissolve the orders, courts should consider whether schools “had complied in good faith with the desegregation degree since it was entered” and “whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable.” Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247, 249-50
(1991). In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court ruled that courts could withdraw supervision over certain aspects in which school district has achieved partial unitary status, since “[a] district court
need not retain active control over every aspect of school administration until a school district
has demonstrated unitary status in all facets of its system.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
471 (1992). Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court held that desegregation orders must be
a limited remedy for victims of de jure segregation. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 137
(1995). See Reardon, et al., supra, at 877-78.
51
Reardon et al., supra note 50, at 899.
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districts that were under court ordered supervision were granted unitary
status.52
Finally, in the 2007 Parents Involved decision, the Supreme Court
struck down voluntary racial integration plans in Louisville, Kentucky,
and Seattle, Washington, on the basis that these school districts lacked a
compelling interest for using race-based assignments and, further, that alternative race-neutral methods would be effective in achieving each district’s integration goals.53 Parents Involved has prevented school districts
from considering race when implementing voluntary school integration
plans.54 While Brown I’s monumental decision opened the door for many
students and families to challenge segregation in their districts, the Supreme Court’s subsequent legal precedent has left few options for advocates who are trying to integrate public schools through the federal courts.
II.
A.

SUING IN FEDERAL COURT: A DEAD END FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS
EXPERIENCING DE FACTO SEGREGATION
The Process of Federal Desegregation Litigation

Desegregation litigation in federal district court is an arduous process.55 As previously mentioned, federal courts can only order integration
(or school desegregation) of a school district that once experienced—or
is experiencing—state-mandated, de jure segregation.56 De jure segregation is found when “a current condition of segregation result[s] from intentional state action directed specifically to the [allegedly segregated]
school[].”57 Thus, a plaintiff must prove either that state-mandated intentional segregation is present in the school district or that a state policy

52

Id. at 878 (discussing data from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which was obtained after reviewing the status of desegregation orders in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina).
53
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730-31,
733 (2007) (plurality opinion); Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate and Unequal: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 633, 635-37 (2014).
54
Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 638.
55
See generally School Desegregation and Integration: De Jure, UNIV. MO. SCH. LAW,
https://perma.cc/5ARP-Z4Z7 (last updated May 27, 2016, 9:27 AM) (outlining the process of
desegregation litigation in federal court and noting key Supreme Court cases in school desegregation jurisprudence).
56
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240 (1991) (initiating District Court
supervision upon finding that “Oklahoma City was operating a ‘dual’ school system – one that
was intentionally segregated by race.”).
57
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration in
original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06
(1973)).
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which has led to de facto segregation has a discriminatory intent.58 While
post-Brown state-mandated segregation is clearly impermissible, it is extremely challenging for plaintiffs to prove that a policy’s underlying intent is discriminatory.59 If the plaintiff is successful, however, the district
court will find that the school district unconstitutionally segregates students in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as per Brown I.60 The district court
will then issue a desegregation order that requires the school board to implement remedial measures that will desegregate the school district.61
Usually, the district court gives the school board and other interested parties the opportunity to present a desegregation plan.62 The school district
can also appeal the decision.63 After the district court issues a final desegregation order, the court then monitors the execution of that order, which
could include requiring the school board to provide reports about its compliance with the plan or appointing a compliance officer.64 Once a school
district eliminates all traces of intentional segregation, it will achieve
“unitary status” and judicial oversight will end.65
B.

The Impact of Desegregation Litigation

The U.S. Department of Justice has not been forthcoming in providing up-to-date data on active desegregation orders.66 Further, some federal
courts are unaware of the number of segregation orders in their dockets
or are simply releasing districts from judicial oversight, even where segregation continues.67 To this extent, even students that attend school in
districts that experience de jure segregation face frustrating battles to integrate their schools.

58
See Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
387, 437 (2017).
59
Id.
60
Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
61
COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., supra note 41, at 1.
62
Id. It is unclear how desegregation orders are monitored today. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 21.
63
See, e.g., Eliot C. McLaughlin, Mississippi School District Ends Segregation Fight,
CNN, https://perma.cc/R4MX-SHYD (last updated Mar. 14, 2017, 5:41 PM).
64
COWEN INST. FOR PUB. EDUC. INITIATIVES, TULANE UNIV., supra note 41, at 2.
65
Id. For example, in order for the New Kent School Board to have achieved unitary
status as a desegregated school system, the school district needed to demonstrate a good faith
elimination of all traces of intentional segregation in student assignment, faculty assignment,
staff assignment, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. See Green v. Cty.
Sch. Bd. of New Kent, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
66
Hannah-Jones, supra note 21.
67
Id.
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As a result of current desegregation jurisprudence, students and parents who initiate new lawsuits against their school districts are unlikely to
succeed in federal court because it has become increasingly difficult to
prove intentional discrimination by the state.68 Specifically, this is because plaintiffs must prove more than a mere discriminatory effect, and
school boards are able to mask their discriminatory motives.69 “Given its
illegality, discriminatory intent is seldom, if ever, explicit,” and “nearly
impossible to prove in practice.”70 This is because, even if a court orders
a school district to desegregate, it is highly likely that the district will not
comply or properly oversee desegregation, or will resegregate.71
Despite the improbability of obtaining relief through federal desegregation litigation, a Brown-era case in Cleveland, Mississippi recently
reached a hopeful conclusion. In 2017, after the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi ordered the Cleveland School District
to desegregate its school system, the school district voted to end its appeal.72 Instead, the court accepted the parties’ proposal: to combine the
two segregated high schools in the district into one integrated school.73
The case had been active since 1969, when a judge initially ordered the
Cleveland School District to desegregate, but the district had failed in its
attempts to follow the court’s order.74 The newly integrated Cleveland
Central High School opened its doors in the fall of 2017.75
68
Eric S. Stein, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003, 2004
(1990).
69
Id.
70
Darby & Levy, supra note 58, at 437. “We emphasize that the differentiating factor
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.” Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973); see Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 755 (1974); Why Is This Happening? with Chris Hayes: Investigating School Segregation with Nikole Hannah-Jones, NBC (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/XDU3-FVLV
(discussing the rise of de facto segregation despite the fact that racially restrictive covenants
and mandated segregation have been outlawed).
71
See Stancil, supra note 8.
72
McLaughlin, supra note 63; see Cowan v. Bolivar Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV00031-DMB, 2017 WL 988411 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2017).
73
Cowan, 2017 WL 988411, at *1-2 (“Under this agreement, the District will consolidate
its ninth through twelfth grade students into a single comprehensive high school housed in the
current facilities at Cleveland High School and Margaret Green Junior High School.”); Edwin
Rios, A Mississippi Town Finally Desegregated Its Schools, 60 Years Later, MOTHER JONES,
Nov.-Dec. 2017, https://perma.cc/7M88-RJ98.
74
“In 1989, a court ordered the Cleveland school district to bus students between the two
high schools for shared classes.” Rios, supra note 73. In 2011, the Justice Department found
that the district “failed to make good faith efforts to eliminate the vestiges of its former dual
school system.” Id. In 2013, a court ordered the Cleveland school district to allow students to
enroll in whichever school they wanted. Id.
75
Kelsey Davis & Aallyah Wright, Cleveland Central High Opens New Era for School
District, MISSISSIPI TODAY (Aug. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/SZ8X-795B.
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The outcome of the Cleveland litigation is a best-case scenario for
challenging ongoing school segregation that is a result of prior de jure
segregation. To challenge de facto segregation, however, creative litigation strategies are required. In places like New York City, one litigation
option is to address school funding schemes that lead to unequal distribution of resources between predominantly Black and Latinx schools and
those of their white peers, in what is dubbed “school finance litigation.”
Another option is to ask courts to “read in” anti-segregation language into
the New York State constitution, a strategy that has been successful in
other states. And finally, as this Note argues, advocates can use the local
Human Rights Law as a tool to address inequality that is a symptom of
school segregation.
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS: SUCCESS REMAINS
TO BE SEEN
For decades, state finance litigation has been an attractive strategy
for plaintiffs fighting de facto segregation, including plaintiffs who bring
claims in state courts.76 Plaintiffs have used school finance litigation to
challenge funding schemes of school districts with predominantly students of color, who are provided with fewer resources than students of
predominantly white schools.77 The premise of state financial litigation is
that unequal or inadequate school funding violates both the equal protection and the education clauses of a state’s constitution.78 Originally, litigants sought equalized funding for school districts under state constitutions; however, their losses outnumbered their successes.79 As a result,
litigants then shifted “their focus from equitable funding to inadequate
funding.”80
A.

Connecticut: The Slow Aftermath of Sheff

A line of cases arising out of Hartford, Connecticut, illustrates the
successful use of state finance litigation to address unequal funding
schemes. In 1977, in Horton v. Meskill, the Connecticut Supreme Court

76

See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252-53 (1999).
See id. at 253.
78
James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1223, 1229 (2008). For more information about state finance litigation in states across the
United States, see School Finance Litigation, by Year, Case, and Status, by State: 1970-2009,
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/edfin/litigation.asp (last visited Apr. 2,
2019).
79
Ryan, supra note 78.
80
Id.
77
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held that unequal school financing violates a student’s right to “a substantially equal educational opportunity,” as required by the education clause
of the Connecticut State Constitution.81 In 1996, in Sheff v. O’Neill, the
same court expanded on the Horton decision and declared that de facto
school segregation in Hartford public schools violated Connecticut’s constitutional mandate to provide the city’s children with a “substantially
equal” education.82 The court read two clauses of the Connecticut Constitution together: “the education clause, which guarantees ‘free public elementary and secondary schools in the state’ and the segregation clause,
which guarantees that no person shall ‘be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil rights because
of . . . race [or] ancestry.’”83 The Court found that Connecticut’s segregation clause informed the state’s education clause.84 As such, “the existence of racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system deprive[d]
school children of a substantially equal educational opportunity” and violated the state’s constitution.85 The court then ordered the Connecticut
legislature to take remedial measures and to develop a plan to address
segregation in Hartford public schools.86
Despite this monumental decision, only eleven percent of Hartford
students attended integrated schools during the 2007–2008 school year.87
Advocates on behalf of the plaintiffs in Sheff returned to court in an attempt to hold the state and the city accountable.88 In 2015, Connecticut
settled with the plaintiffs to add more seats in suburban school districts

81

Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (Conn. 1977).
Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280-86 (Conn. 1996) (“We therefore hold that, textually, [the education clause] . . . requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to
remedy segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred
de jure or de facto . . . . In summary, under our law, which imposes an affirmative constitutional obligation on the legislature to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity for
all public schoolchildren, the state action doctrine is not a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims of
constitutional deprivation.”); see also Ryan, supra note 30, at 530.
83
Ryan, supra note 30, at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1270
n.1, n.2).
84
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1283; Ryan, supra note 30, at 530.
85
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281, 1281-83; Ryan, supra note 30, at 530.
86
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290.
87
An integrated school is one where “less than three-quarters of a school’s student population are minorities.” Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Nearly Half the Students from Hartford Now
Attend Integrated Schools, CT MIRROR (Nov. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/B447-2S9A.
88
See Denisa R. Superville, New Settlement Reached in Hartford, Conn., Desegregation
Case, EDUC. WEEK: DISTRICT DOSSIER (Feb. 27, 2015, 5:05 PM), https://perma.cc/XK3PG238.
82
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for inner-city students and to work towards having fifty percent of Hartford students in magnet schools.89 Twenty-two years after Sheff’s original
ruling, Hartford is still not fully integrated, but substantial improvement
has been made. By the fall of 2016, forty-nine percent of Hartford minority students attended integrated schools.90 Hartford now faces, however,
a common problem that school systems across the country are facing since
Brown I: white parents are not convinced that it is in their children’s best
interests to attend integrated magnet schools outside of their neighborhoods or their zones.91 In 2017, 45.6% of Hartford minority students attended integrated schools, a drop from 49% in 2016 and below the recent
settlement-mandated percentage of 47.5%.92
B.

New York: Still Waiting for Funds

Similar to the strategy used by the plaintiffs in Sheff, school finance
litigation has been used to address school inequity in New York as well.
The Education Article of the New York State Constitution provides that
“the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system
of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated.”93 In the 1982 Levittown decision, the New York Court of Appeals, the State’s highest court, interpreted New York State’s Education
Article to entitle students to a “sound basic education.”94
Subsequently, in 1993, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity (“CFE”), an
interest group comprised of parents,95 filed a lawsuit against the state alleging that the “State’s educational financing scheme fail[ed] to provide
89
Id. A system of magnet schools, which parents could voluntarily opt their children into,
was the method that Hartford employed to desegregate its schools. Carmen Baskauf & Lucy
Nalpathanchil, With Sheff Back in Court, A Look at School Integration in Hartford, CONN.
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/GB8V-MVBB. This method has been recognized as a model for integration across the country, yet the Hartford district still faces its own
challenges to achieve integration. Id. For more information about magnet schools, see Ali
Trachta, Charter Schools vs. Magnet Schools, NICHE, https://perma.cc/7VPJ-PX66 (last visited May 2, 2019).
90
Kathleen Megan & Matthew Kauffman, Under New Rules, State Says More Hartford
Students Attend Integrated Schools, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 1, 2016, 5:46 PM),
https://perma.cc/P7HR-L38A.
91
This American Life: The Problem We All Live With - Part Two, CHI. PUB. MEDIA (Aug.
7,
2015),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/563/the-problem-we-all-live-with-part-two
[https://perma.cc/98WU-ZWVU].
92
Matthew Kauffman, Number of Hartford Students in Integrated Schools Drops by Hundreds, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://perma.cc/KF35-GKF5.
93
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
94
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48 (1982).
95
A group of parents formed an interest group called the Campaign for Fiscal Equity
(“CFE”) and filed a lawsuit alleging that their children were not being provided access to an
adequate education. CFE no longer exists as a non-profit. The Alliance for Quality Education
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public school students in the City of New York . . . [with] an opportunity
to obtain a sound basic education as required by the State Constitution.”96
The State filed a motion to dismiss the claim for failure to state a cause of
action, and the New York Court of Appeals eventually denied the motion,
holding that the plaintiffs did have a viable cause of action under the Education Clause.97 Affirming the underlying principles of Levittown, the
court clearly stated that “a system which failed to provide for a sound
basic education would violate the Education Article.”98 The court articulated that a “sound basic education” “should consist of the basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually
function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving
on a jury” and “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms.”99
The court concluded that, to prove their case, plaintiffs must establish “a
causal link between the present funding system and any proven failure to
provide a sound basic education to New York City school children.”100
After years of preparing for trial and organizing with community
groups, the trial court found that the State’s method for funding education
in NYC violated students’ rights under the State Education Article.101
However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, articulating further that the Education Article only mandates an opportunity to receive
the “skills necessary to obtain employment, and to competently discharge
one’s civic responsibilities”102 and that the facilities and resources in
NYC’s public schools were not “so inadequate as to deprive students of
the opportunity to acquire the skills that constitute a sound basic education.”103 Further, the Appellate Division determined that the State is not
responsible for the demographic factors facing certain students, such as
“poverty, high crime neighborhoods, single parent or dysfunctional
homes, homes where English is not spoken, or homes where parents offer
was created in 2000 to provide support for CFE and continues to work for educational equity
in New York state. Equity, ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., https://perma.cc/PP4F-3YF2 (last
visited May 2, 2019).
96
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 314 (1995) (CFE I).
97
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 295 A.D.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t
2002) (discussing CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995)). In denying the state’s motion to dismiss, the
New York Court of Appeals established a framework for the trial court to determine whether
the state was providing NYC public school students with a sound basic education. Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 187 Misc. 1, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001).
98
CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d at 316.
99
Id. at 316, 317.
100
Id. at 318.
101
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, No. 111070/93, 2001 WL 35912269 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. January 31, 2001) (per curiam); ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note
95.
102
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 295 A.D.2d 1, 8 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2002).
103
Id. at 11.
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little help with homework and motivation.”104 Ultimately, the court stated
that this was because the appropriate “cure lies in eliminating the socioeconomic conditions facing certain students.”105
The New York Court of Appeals reversed this decision in 2003,
holding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a causal link between the
state’s current funding system and its failure to provide NYC school children with “better teachers, facilities, and instrumentalities of learning.”106
The court noted:
Plaintiffs have prevailed here owing to a unique combination of
circumstances: New York City schools have the most student
need in the state and the highest local costs yet receive some of
the lowest per-student funding and have some of the worst results.
Plaintiffs in other districts who cannot demonstrate a similar combination may find tougher going in the courts.107
As a result, the court directed the Legislature and the Governor to
articulate a funding scheme as a way to reform the education funding system in NYC.108 In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals accepted the
state’s minimum funding amount recommendation as reasonable,109
which the State still owes today.110
The CFE line of cases demonstrate that, even when plaintiffs successfully prove a causal link between a lack of funding for schools and
students’ access to the constitutionally-mandated level of education, this
is still not enough to ensure educational equality in NYC.

104

Id. at 16. The Appellate Division relied on the plaintiffs’ expert, who “conceded that
investing money ‘in the family’ rather than the schools ‘might pay off even more.” Id.
105
Id. For more information about how socio-economic status of students is linked to
school funding, see MATTHEW M. CHINGOS & KRISTEN BLAGG, DO POOR KIDS GET THEIR FAIR
SHARE OF SCHOOL FUNDING? (2017), https://perma.cc/89SP-EHJV.
106
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 919 (2003) (CFE II). The
trial court concluded that, for example, that teacher certification rates “are too low” in NYC,
based on evidence that established a correlation between teacher certification and increased
student performance. Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 187 Misc. 2d 1, 2627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001)).
107
Id. at 932 (emphasis in original).
108
Id. at 930, 958; ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note 95. Between 2004 and 2006,
the state failed to establish a minimum funding amount per the court’s order. Then, the trial
court appointed a Panel of Judicial Referees to make recommendations to the court, the State’s
Governor appealed that decision, and the Appellate Division ordered the state to comply.
ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY EDUC., supra note 95.
109
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 19-20 (2006).
110
Joint Legislative Hearing on the Executive Proposal 2018-2019, Testimony by Alliance
for Quality Education (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/3NAG-6UHU.
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IV. A STRATEGY IN STATE COURT: INTEGRATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATE
State finance litigation, as it pertains to challenging unequal resources, has largely fallen out of use because success in court has not
translated to the full integration of school districts. In many states, including New York, advocates have tried to persuade state courts that integration is a mandate required by their respective state constitutions.
A.

Minnesota: A New Attempt

Advocates in Minnesota are trying a new strategy that frames segregation not only as an issue of unequal resources but also as an issue that
violates the state constitution itself.111 In 2016, seven parents and guardians filed a lawsuit against the State of Minnesota in Hennepin County
District Court, claiming that state officials violated the Education Clause
of the Minnesota Constitution by denying them an “adequate education”
and enabling a segregated education.112 The plaintiffs argued that, under
the seminal Minnesota state case Skeen v. State, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota had interpreted its education clause to mean that schools must
meet “baseline level of adequacy and uniformity” of education, and that
a separate but equal education system does not meet that requirement.113
The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ case on the
grounds that it was not justiciable (able to be litigated) because it is the
state legislature’s responsibility to establish “qualitative educational
standards,” not the judiciary’s.114
In January 2018, the Minnesota Supreme Court heard oral arguments
on the issue of justiciability.115 The plaintiffs argued that the judiciary has
the power to determine whether the legislature violated its constitutional
obligation under Minnesota’s Education Clause, and the court concluded
that the plaintiffs’ claims could be litigated.116 The plaintiffs’ supporters
believe that a victory in this case could be used as persuasive precedent
to support efforts to make school segregation an issue under other state

111
Brandie Burris-Gallagher, The Court’s Role in Education: Why the Cruz-Guzman Lawsuit Is a Big Deal, EDALLIES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/QXQ8-C5VJ.
112
Appellants’ Brief at 3, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017)
(No. A16-1265), 2016 WL 10894525.
113
Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ Brief and Addendum at 12-13, 27, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892
N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (No. A16-1265), 2017 WL 7550718; see also Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993).
114
Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 541; see also Burris-Gallagher, supra note 111.
115
Burris-Gallagher, supra note 111.
116
Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2018).
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constitutions throughout the United States.117 However, charter school interest groups, who support the State of Minnesota in this case, claim that
state constitutional protections against school segregation would impede
on parents’ rights to school choice.118 This same argument could be made
in NYC, where research shows that, while segregation was caused by redlining and housing discrimination, school choice has exacerbated the
problem.119 Advocates for integration in New York, however, face a similar obstacle as those in Minnesota: convincing the New York Court of
Appeals that segregation violates the New York State Constitution.
B.

New York: A Weak Education Article

Advocates in New York have taken the fight against school segregation to the New York Court of Appeals under the State’s Education
Clause.120 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has effectively prevented advocates from using the Education Clause to remedy school segregation by articulating a low standard of quality education that a school
system must provide to its students.121
To fulfill its constitutional obligation and provide a sound basic education, the state must provide certain educational “inputs” to ensure that
required student “outputs” are met.122 In other words, the state must provide “the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources . . . to
provide students with the opportunity to obtain these essential skills” and
117

Rachel M. Cohen, School Desegregation Lawsuit Threatens, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 26,
2016), https://perma.cc/UCY9-9HR9; Dana Goldstein, How Do You Get Better Schools? Take
the State to Court, More Advocates Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://perma.
cc/7M2W-AD6N.
118
Cohen, supra note 117; Goldstein, supra note 117.
119
While the term “school choice” may seem like it has nothing to do with the government
action, policy decisions have allowed charter schools to flourish and parents to flee their zoned
schools, which leaves poor, underperforming, and segregated schools in their wake. See
NICOLE MADER ET AL., THE NEW SCH., CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFAIRS, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
HOW SCHOOL CHOICE DIVIDES N.Y.C. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS 4 (May 2018), https://
perma.cc/B2FK-G3ET; Elizabeth A. Harris, First Test for New York Chancellor: A Middle
School Desegregation Plan, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/6F3Y-ZJWF; Kate
Taylor, A Manhattan District Where School Choice Amounts to Segregation, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/U3MD-75CG.
120
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) v. New York, 4 N.Y.3d 175 (2005); Paynter
v. New York, 100 N.Y.2d 434 (2003).
121
See generally NYCLU, 4 N.Y.3d 175; Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d 434.
122
Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d at 440 (“[T]he State fails to provide [students] a sound basic education in that it provides deficient inputs--teaching, facilities and instrumentalities of learning--which lead to deficient outputs such as test results and graduation rates.”) (discussing the
pleading standard elaborated in CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 317-18 (1995)); see also Bran C.
Noonan, The Fate of New York Public Education is a Matter of Interpretation: A Story of
Competing Methods of Constitutional Interpretation, the Nature of Law, and a Functional
Approach to the New York Education Article, 70 ALB. L. REV. 625, 630-31 (2007).
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achievements, as required by the New York State Constitution.123 Thus,
to succeed, plaintiffs must clearly demonstrate that there is a causal connection between the deficient state input and subsequent deficient student
output.124 While the strength of that link is difficult to measure, it can be
proven through evidence demonstrating how poor facilities, overcrowded
school buildings, and outdated curriculums lead to low graduation rates
and test scores.125
After the New York Court of Appeals mandated the state to establish
a minimum funding amount for NYC Public Schools in 2003,126 advocates tried to use the Education Article to address inequitable funding and
school segregation in other parts of the State outside of New York City.
Two New York Court of Appeals cases, Paynter v. State of New York and
New York Civil Liberties Union v. State of New York, demonstrate that the
Education Article fails to protect students against school segregation in
New York, including New York City.127 Further, these cases demonstrate
how the New York Court of Appeals has limited the scope of its remedy
in Campaign for Fiscal Equity.
The New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), representing the
plaintiffs, sought to extend the rulings of Campaign for Fiscal Equity and
alleged “that students in 27 named schools outside of New York City
[were] being denied the opportunity for a sound basic education.”128 Since
the New York Court of Appeals had mandated a funding scheme to make
up for inequities in the NYC public schools in the Campaign for Fiscal
Equity cases, NYCLU maintained that the State must put in place corrective measures to address “impoverished education in schools outside of
New York City.”129 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, stating
that the “New York Constitution does not require equality in educational
offerings throughout the state.”130 The Constitution does, however, require the state to meet the minimum standards of educational quality.131
In doing so, the court emphasized that local governments should maintain
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control over their local school districts and limited how retroactive funding could be provided to remedy inadequate resources in individual public
schools across the state.132
In Paynter v. New York, fifteen students in the Rochester City School
District alleged that racial and socioeconomic segregation—by the State’s
action or inaction—deprived them of a sound basic education under the
New York State Constitution.133 The case never went to trial, as the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the State’s motion to dismiss the
claim.134 The plaintiffs did not claim that the State provided deficient
“teaching, facilities, or instrumentalities of learning.”135 Rather, they argued that the State’s practices and policies resulted in a segregated demographic composition of the schools, which led to “some of the lowest test
scores and graduation rates in the state.”136 The court stated that proof of
“academic failure” alone, without proof that the State had failed in their
duty under the New York State Constitution, does not rise to a cause of
action under the Education Article.137 Further, the court articulated that
New York State has no constitutional responsibility to change the demographics of school districts with high concentrations of poverty and
racial isolation in order to improve academic performance.138 This holding reinforces the notion that if the state merely provides “adequate resources,” it “satisfies its constitutional promise under the Education Article, even though student performance remains substandard,” segregated
student body notwithstanding.139
Paynter and NYCLU reveal that the Education Article provides a limited avenue for students and their families to address persistent inequities
in school systems across the state. The New York Court of Appeals remains hesitant to expand the holdings of the CFE cases to address inequality that is unrelated to school funding outside of the NYCs public
schools. Further, the court refuses to apply the Education Article in such
a way that could remedy the segregation that exists in NYC and throughout the state. In effect, the New York Court of Appeals has essentially
closed off the state constitution as a way for students and parents in segregated school districts to seek relief throughout the state. And, while
NYC public schools have achieved some success and received a judgment
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establishing a minimum funding scheme to provide students with an adequate education, the system remains deeply segregated.
V. A CREATIVE LITIGATION FRONTIER: THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
A.

Background on Litigation Under the NYCHRL

Because the New York Court of Appeals held that segregated
schools do not violate the Education Article in Paynter, advocates are,
and should be, looking for other ways to seek relief. The New York City
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) may be a promising tool for advocates
to use in challenging aspects of educational inequity that are facets of
school segregation, such as discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in public accommodations.140
The NYCHRL was created in 1965 after incorporating two local
laws: Local Law 80, which banned discrimination in private housing, and
Local Law 55, which created the Commission on Intergroup Relations.141
The NYC Commission on Human Rights is the administrative body
charged with enforcing the NYCHRL and educating the public about the
law.142 Today, the Human Rights Law is “one of the most comprehensive
civil rights laws in the nation” and “prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations”143 based on “race, color, religion/creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender
(including sexual harassment), gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, pregnancy, marital status, and partnership status.”144 Since its inception, the NYCHRL has protected New Yorkers against discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, age, and national origin, while the other classes
were added later over time.145 The NYCHRL has generally been used to
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combat discriminatory practices by employers, such as retaliation and
harassment, to offer “additional protections in housing,” and to protect
against “bias-based profiling by law enforcement.”146
Until recently, state and federal courts in New York have not taken
litigation under the NYCHRL seriously. Specifically, state and federal
courts previously declined to develop a unique legal standard under the
NYCHRL.147 If courts did engage in an analysis of the NYCHRL, judges
chose to follow “rote parallelism”148 because the courts viewed the
NYCHRL as a carbon copy of its corresponding state and federal law,
instead of liberally construing the NYCHRL to reach its potential in
providing New Yorkers with more protection against various forms of
discrimination.149 Federal law even supports liberal construction of local
law. For example, Title VII, the federal counterpart to the NYCHRL,
states that nothing in the law exempts a person from liability under any
present or future local law.150
Recognizing this problem, the NYC Council passed the Local Civil
Rights Restoration Act in 2005 to combat this prevailing practice in the
judiciary.151 The NYC Council envisioned that the NYCHRL would be
the ceiling of protection and not the floor, as state and federal laws are
treated.152 Therefore, the Restoration Act mandates that “the provisions
of [the NYCHRL] are to be construed independently from similar or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”153 In this way, the
NYCHRL is intended to “meld the broadest vision of social justice with
the strongest law enforcement deterrent” and to protect the rights of all
people to be free from discrimination, in a way that the federal civil rights
law and state human rights law have not been able to accomplish.154
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The power of the NYCHRL has come to fruition in employment discrimination and sexual harassment cases.155 In these contexts, both state
and federal courts have acknowledged that the NYCHRL requires a different analysis than the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL)
and Title VII.156 For example, under the NYSHRL and Title VII, plaintiffs
must prove that the harassment or discrimination is either severe or pervasive.157 However, under the NYCHRL, plaintiffs must demonstrate
only that they were treated less well than other employees based on a protected class.158 In cases involving discrimination based on race, if a defendant has put forth “one or more nondiscriminatory motivations for its
actions,”159 a plaintiff must respond “with some evidence that at least one
of the reasons proffered . . . is false, misleading, or incomplete.”160 In addition, in some jurisdictions, employers can successfully assert a defense
under NYSHRL and Title VII by demonstrating that they maintain antiharassment policies and reporting avenues and promptly address complaints.161 However, employers are strictly liable for harassment by managers and supervisors under the NYCHRL.162 Overall, the NYCHRL provides greater protections to plaintiffs than its state or federal
counterparts.163 Since neither federal equal protection laws nor the federal
or state constitutions have proven useful in protecting against segregation,
the Human Rights Law is a promising new frontier for NYC advocates to
use in desegregation litigation.
B.

Litigation Against School Inequity Under the NYCHRL

In the realm of education discrimination, school equity advocates
have not used the NYCHRL as an avenue to combat school segregation
in the same way as it has been used to seek relief from workplace discrimination and harassment. To that end, school equity advocates have little
jurisprudence to draw from to craft their positions under the NYCHRL.
Broadly, however, the NYCHRL protects individuals from discrimination
155
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in the area of public accommodations.164 Since public schools are public
accommodations, the NYC public school system must meet, and is subject to, the requirements of this law.165
Despite the lack of jurisprudence, advocates have started to explore
using the NYCHRL to combat educational discrimination in NYC public
schools. In 2018, four Black and Latinx public high school students, on
behalf of a class of all Black and Latinx students who attend segregated
NYC schools, and IntegrateNYC, a student-led advocacy organization,
filed L.P. v. New York City Department of Education, a lawsuit against
the NYC Department of Education (“DOE”), the Public Schools Athletic
League (“PSAL”),166 and PSAL’s Executive Director, Donald J. Douglas,
as defendants.167 The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Lawyers
for the Public Interest (“NYLPI”), argued that the defendants violated the
NYCHRL by maintaining “discriminatory policies that deny Black and
Latin[x] students equal access to the life-changing possibilities of
sports,”168 which negatively impacts their physical health, mental health,
teamwork skills, community ties, and friendships, and negatively influences their college opportunities.169 While this lawsuit is not particularly
addressing school segregation at large, it addresses a facet of school inequality—sports access—that disproportionately affects students of color
in NYC public schools.170
Importantly, the students brought the case against the defendants as
providers and managers of NYC public school accommodations.171 The
students claimed that, as managers, the defendants withheld and denied
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their rightful access to “accommodations, facilities, advantages, and privileges related to sports teams on account of [their] race” and promulgated
and maintained “practices that result in a disparate impact [based upon
race] to the detriment of the [students].”172 The students demonstrated
their claims with evidence of the disproportionate lack of access to sports
teams for Black and Latinx students, and the disparate impact on them
resulting from policies that benefit schools with established sports
teams.173 These policies include “‘grandfathering’ established teams,”
which favors established schools with fewer Black and Latinx students,
“maintaining an opaque and discretionary team-granting system” which
leads to a lower grant rate of sports teams in schools with higher proportions of Black and Latinx students, and “preventing students from participating on PSAL teams outside the school where they are enrolled.”174
This lawsuit was filed after years of legislative and grassroots advocacy from students and teachers impacted by the lack of access to sports
teams. Over two decades ago, NYC began dismantling many large, underperforming high schools to create smaller high schools,175 with the
idea that smaller educational settings would foster better academic relationships between students and their teachers and increase graduation
rates.176 These schools, however, were primarily comprised of people of
color and immigrant students and, thus, these same populations now comprise the newer, smaller schools as well.177 PSAL did not adapt their policies to permit creating and maintaining sports teams at these smaller
schools.178 Thus, “[t]he schools with the least access to sports teams ‘have
the highest numbers of students of color, or for whom English is not their
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first language.’”179 As a result, students of color in these smaller schools
who wanted to play on particular sports teams suffered.180
In 2011, David Garcia-Rosen, a teacher and an activist, other school
administrators, and high school students in the Bronx created the Small
Schools Athletic League to provide these students with access to sports
teams, with virtually no support from the Education Department or
PSAL.181 Unfortunately, this proposal did not steadily increase access to
sports teams, since students in predominantly Black and Latinx schools
across the city still did not have equal access to sports teams.182 The Fair
Play Coalition, a collection of students, teachers, coaches, and lawyers,
are using the lawsuit to expand access to school sports across NYC and
guarantee that all students have an opportunity to play a sport that PSAL
offers students.183
The students in L.P. are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against defendants, yet also offer as solutions alternative policies that the
defendants should implement for less discriminatory outcomes, such as
“mandat[ing] that every small New York City high school be considered
part of an ‘umbrella program’ with co-located or nearby schools” such
that each group would have the same number of students.184 PSAL, then,
“could grant each program an equal number of PSAL teams,” to ensure
that all NYC public high school students have an equal opportunity to
access sports teams.185 The defendants have responded and denied the
claims.186
In 2019, the NYC Department of Education unveiled a pilot program
entitled “PSAL-All Access.”187 Twenty-six schools from Manhattan, the
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Bronx, and Brooklyn that enroll 8,500 students will have access to nineteen PSAL sports teams.188 The program will also permit students from
these participating schools to join sports teams at nearby schools if their
respective school does not provide a certain sports team.189 However,
Melissa Iachan, Senior Staff Attorney at NYLPI and a lead lawyer in L.P.,
stated that the program “is too small to make a dent in the issue” before
the court, as “the pilot program does not change the pervasive systematic
racial inequality in the current PSAL system.”190
At this point, the parties have entered a settlement negotiation agreement and the court has granted the plaintiffs an extension to move for
class certification.191 It is conceivable that the students could be successful if the New York Supreme Court of Bronx County views that they are
treated “less well” than their white student counterparts—who have access to PSAL sports teams—because of their race and ethnicity, taking
the NYCHRL to the “furthest reaches of what is constitutionally permissible.”192 In this case, the court will have to ensure that NYC public
schools are no longer separate and unequal, but have equal sports resources, taking a step towards integration.
The lawsuit against the DOE and PSAL under the NYCHRL is an
example of litigation advocacy that looks beyond federal and state law
and takes advantage of a local law that could finally safeguard plaintiffs
against a form of discrimination that they would not originally be protected from—school segregation. This lawsuit advises advocates to strategize and challenge individual aspects of educational inequity, whether it
be access to sports teams, extracurricular activities, or after-school programs.
VI. BEYOND LITIGATION
Underlying any litigation effort must be a desire to truly serve the
needs of communities affected by educational inequity. Brown I made
school segregation a national issue after the LDF constructed a decades-
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long strategy to combat racial discrimination in education.193 In NYC,
grassroots organizing around integrating schools has been a long-standing
tradition that is in full force today.194 Unlike pre-Brown efforts, however,
it is incumbent on attorneys to work with the specific communities impacted by school segregation and not to solely litigate on behalf of marginalized groups.195
One way to practice this type of lawyering is to follow the advocacy
that led to the NYLPI’s complaint against the DOE and PSAL. Advocates,
including students and teachers from segregated schools in NYC, organized for years before the complaint was even filed.196 After addressing
the lack of sports access through organizing, the complaint was filed in
continuation of the ongoing fight. Thus, litigation stemmed from the organizing, and in turn was tailored to address only a portion of school inequity that results from school segregation. In this way, a suggested strategy could be to fight inequalities piece by piece, while confronting the
whole systemic problem of racial segregation in NYC public schools.
A recommendation for future litigation is to address the high rates of
school suspensions that impact Black and Latinx students. Advocates are
currently organizing to reduce the maximum number of days that students
can be suspended from school.197 A potential claim under the NYCHRL
could be that the disproportionate rate at which Black and Latinx students
are suspended in NYC public schools, as compared to other races, results
in disparate impact on those students.198 Advocates may have additional
leverage with this argument because, as of 2011, the DOE must report
discipline and suspension data to the NYC Council as mandated by the
193
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NYCHRL.199 In sum, lawyers must work in conjunction with communities impacted by racial segregation in school to determine the best course
of action to fit their needs.
CONCLUSION
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown I, Ella Baker, an organizer and civil rights leader, expressed her frustration with the general
ignorance surrounding school segregation in New York.200 With the
NAACP’s focus on remedying segregation in the South, she commented,
“[W]hat do you do about the poor children right here?”201 Students, parents, and advocates are still asking that same question today and, like
Baker, are actively trying to remedy school segregation in NYC. Educational inequity, as a function of school segregation, is a persistent problem
in NYC that is gaining political traction but is long overdue to be readily
fixed.
It goes without saying that all children in NYC, regardless of race,
should be provided access to an excellent education. As one option, advocates should creatively initiate litigation that challenges facets of unequal school systems under the NYCHRL. But, it is important to
acknowledge that this tactic will not solve education inequality, as there
is no single solution to this problem. To ensure that all children in NYC
receive the education that they deserve, advocates must: challenge funding schemes, access to sports and after-school programs, and distributions
based on race, gender, and test scores across the city; understand the effect
that white supremacy has had on keeping our schools separate and unequal; and listen to the realities of NYC public school students and follow
their lead.202
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